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NOTES
the effect of actually deceiving or misleading the public. .... The other
division of the court of appeals held that the term "does not require a show-
ing of bad faith, malice, or wantonness, but rather, encompasses both con-
scious, purposeful violations . . . and blatant or deliberate disregard of the
law by those who know, or should know, the requirements of the Open
Meeting Act."' 93 The Court of Criminal Appeals held that a showing of
criminal intent was not necessary to support a conviction under the Act
because the offense was classified as in malum prohibitum.'94
These recent-cases have answered some of the questions raised in this
note. The importance of the Act and the existence of other areas of uncer-
tainty indicate that further judicial clarification can be expected.
Open meeting legislation is in the finest tradition of American govern-
ment and seeks to give substance to the ideals of democracy. Effective self-
rule requires that the populace be informed, but this result cannot occur
when the agencies of government conceal their actions behind closed doors.
Public access to governmental processes should assist in promoting public
confidence by replacing mistrust and suspicion with enlightenment and focused
concern.
Open meeting legislation has further implications. The right of the peo-
ple to be aware of and admitted to meetings of governmental agencies should
not be considered in isolation. Rights are always accompanied by respon-
sibilities. Open meeting legislation is meaningless if not utilized; the efforts
of the legislature in drafting a statute as comprehensive as the Open Meeting
Act call for a response from the citizenry in exercising these valuable rights
that have been created. The Open Meeting Act should be a trumpet call
sounding the occasion for a new commitment to citizen involvement in state
and local affairs of government.
Douglas C. McBee
Mortgages: Due-On-Sale Clauses in Oklahoma As
Affected By Continental Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Fetter
In these days of high inflation and fluctuating real estate and mortgage
interest rates, lenders and potential borrowers are concerned with obtaining
the most favorable terms possible from a mortgage contract. As interest rates
92 Haworth Bd. of Educ. v. Havens, 52 OKLA. B.J. 1978, 1979 (Sept. 12, 1981). The case
is also noteworthy because the violation of the Act consisted entirely of posting an inadequate
agenda.
" In re Appeal From Order Declaring Annexation, 52 0KLA. B.J. 1981, 1985 (Sept. 12,
1981).
,9, Hilliary v. State, 630 P.2d 791, 793 (Okla. Cr. App. 1981).
19811
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
rise, a mortgagor would benefit from the ability to use his low interest rate
mortgage note to induce acquisition of his real estate. The ability to assume a
mortgage at a lower-than-market interest rate is naturally very attractive to
one looking to purchase real estate. Conversely, the lender would prefer to
have that lower-than-market loan paid back so that the balance of the money
due under the mortgage could be reloaned at current market rates in order to
maintain a profitable loan portfolio. As a tool for accomplishing this latter
goal, lending institutions have for some time utilized "due-on-sale" clauses
in their mortgage contracts. More recently, "escalation" or "interest adjust-
ment" clauses have been used to supplement due-on-sale language in mort-
gage contracts.
The purpose of this note is twofold. First, it will explain the rationale
and desirability of due-on-sale and escalation clauses. Second, it will attempt
to interpret the impact of Continental Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v.




A typical real estate mortgage contract will contain a provision that
permits the lender to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be due and
payable immediately upon the transfer by the borrower of any part of, or
interest in, the mortgaged property. Such a provision is commonly known as
a due-on-sale clause2
The ability of a lender to accelerate a mortgage upon the transfer of the
property by application of a due-on-sale clause is desirable for two reasons.
First, it permits a lender to maintain a satisfactory loan portfolio yield. By
having money returned that would otherwise be locked in for long amortized
periods, lenders are better able to offset the higher rates they pay on interest-
bearing deposits." Second, this ability provides security to the mortgagee
because ownership of the mortgaged property can be regulated. Such an
ability can be significant where the new purchaser is not creditworthy or is
paying the balance of the purchase price primarily with borrowed money.
564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
2 This note will not address "due-on-encumbrance" clauses (see, e.g., La Sala v.
American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971)); variable
rate mortgages (see, e.g., G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON, & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
677 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE, et al.]; roll-over mortgages (see, e.g., OSBORNE
et al., at 680); or other similar tools used by mortgagees to maintain loan portfolio yields at suf-
ficient levels.
'OSBORN, et al., supra note 2, at 295.
" See generally Ashley, Use of "Due-On" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A
Common-Sense Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 592 (1975).




Enforceability of Due-On-Sale Clauses
Most arguments against enforcement of due-on-sale clauses center
around claims that they constitute an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
6
However, no American court has held a due-on-sale clause to be a per se in-
valid restraint on alienation.
7
The issue of enforceability of due-on-sale clauses first arose in Coast
Bank v. Minderhouts where the California Supreme Court held due-on-sale
clauses not to be per se invalid and declared that a test of reasonableness
under the circumstances of each case would serve to test the enforceability of
the clause. 9
In Cherry v. Home Savings & Loan Ass'n,'" the court discarded the
reasonableness test presented in Coast Bank and held that in the usual case,
due-on-sale clauses would be automatically enforced. The court expressly
recognized the validity of lenders accelerating mortgages to take advantage of
rising interest rates" and made no requirement that the lender show that the
new buyer would pose any kind of security risk as a prerequisite for enforce-
ment.'
Since the Cherry decision, courts in many jurisdictions have ruled upon
the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses.' Although the decisions of the
several jurisdictions that have passed on the enforceability issue are hardly
consistent in every detail, certain patterns are perceptible.'
Automatic Enforcement Versus Presumption of Unenforceability
Courts apparently consider due-on-sale clauses as being either generally
valid devices subject to automatic enforcement in the usual case,' 5 or as
generally invalid restraints upon alienation enforceable only upon a convinc-
ing display of necessity. 16
' See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 Ill. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5
(1975); First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976).
' Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla. 1977);
OSBORNE, et al., supra note 2, at 303.
61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964).
Id. at 316, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Id. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
Id. at 579-80, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
" See, e.g., Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974); Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'rr, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d
1240 (1973); First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976); Gunther v.
White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973).
'4 OSBORNE, et al., supra note 2, at 303.
"S See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1 (1975);
First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976).
"6 See, e.g., Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725
(1972); Bellingham First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090
(1976).
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Courts that favor automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses will
provide relief from unconscionable conduct of lenders in individual cases but
apparently do not consider the validity of each clause on a case-by-case
basis. 7 Rather, "the valid and accepted purpose sought to be achieved by the
restraint in [the] mortgage . . . must determine the validity of the restraint
and not the circumstances of each particular case."' 8 Furthermore, in order
to avoid enforcement of the clause, these courts place the burden on the
mortgagor to show that enforcement would work an unconscionable hard-
ship on him.' 9
Some courts that favor automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
expressly recognize the validity of accelerating real estate mortgages in order
to obtain current interest rates on the balance of the mortgage debt.2 0
The [mortgagees] under their contract have the right to insist upon the
repayment of their loan in the event of sale, so that they can relend the
money at an increased interest rate, and so maintain their supply of
lending money at the level of their present cost of such money. In this
situation, equity should not depart from the law which requires it to
enforce valid contracts and strike down the acceleration option simply
because its exercise will let the [mortgagees], not the [mortgagors],
make the profit on the interest rate occasioned by the increased cost of
money.2'
Another court described the exercise of an option to accelerate a real estate
mortgage in order to maintain the best possible mortgage portfolio as
"eminently proper."' 2
Another justification for automatic enforcement of due-on-sale clauses
is that automatic enforcement better enables title examiners to reasonably
predict the effect of the clauses. One court said: "Since stability of real estate
titles is of paramount importance it is necessary that the court follow a policy
in construing restraints on alienation which will produce a reasonable degree
of certainty."
'23
A second group of courts disfavor automatic enforcement of due-on-
sale clauses. These courts place upon the mortgagee the burden of showing
" See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5
(1975); First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976).
" Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1975).
" See, e.g., Baker v. Loves Park Say. & Loan Ass'n, 61 111. 2d 119, 333 N.E.2d I, 5
(1975); First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (1976).
22 See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n. 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Gunther
v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
21 Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tenn. 1973).
22 Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Van Glahn, 144 N.J. Super. 48, 364 A.2d 558, 561
(1976).




reasonable necessity in order to justify enforcement of a due-on-sale clause .2
They are unpersuaded by the interest market rationale for enforcement of
due-on-sale clauses. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has recently re-
jected that justification outright, 25 contrary to an earlier express recognition
of the inherent validity of such a justification. 26 To succeed in enforcing a
due-on-sale clause in such a jurisdiction, the mortgagee must establish that
the transfer will threaten the lender's security or increase the risk of default
by the new purchaser.
27
The leading case in support of requiring a showing of necessity in order
to enforce a due-on-sale clause is Wellenkamp v. -Bank of America.2 The
California Supreme Court specifically rejected the interest rate protection
justification and thus officially disapproved of the earlier Cherry decision.
Although the court recited several economic risks faced by commercial
lenders, it was unmoved by them. In fact, the court found those risks to be
foreseeable and foreseen economic conditions that lenders "should and do,
as a matter of business necessity, take into account . . . when they initially
determine the rate of payment and the interest on these long term loans." '29
Furthermore, the court placed upon the lender the burden of showing
reasonable necessity for enforcement based on impaired security or risk of
default.2 0
Escalation Clauses
Escalation clauses are devices used by lenders to supplement due-on-
sale language. An escalation clause allows the lender to waive its right to ac-
celerate the mortgage if certain conditions are met.3' Generally, the condi-
tions to be met include an approved credit standing and renegotiation of in-
terest on the loan balance.
32
In Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,33 the Supreme
Court of Washington upheld the enforcement of an escalation clause in a real
estate mortgage. The clause allowed the mortgagee, at his sole option, to
24 It has been said that the grounds for acceleration must be "reasonable on their face."
Tucker v. Pulaski Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 252 Ark. 849, 481 S.W.2d 725, 728 (1972).
2, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379
(1978).
26 Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
11 For a discussion of circumstances that threaten a mortgagee's security and/or increase
the risk of default by the purchaser, see Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629,
639, 526 P.2d 1169, 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 639 (1974).
28 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
28 Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
Id. at 953, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(g) (1980).
22 Id. See also Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d
546 (1976).
11 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
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consent to the change in title and to increase the interest rate on the loan
balance "even without a showing of increased risk to the lender. '
34
Eight months after the Miller decision, the Washington court decided
Bellingham First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison" and held a due-
on-sale clause (without supplemental escalation language) to be an
unreasonable restraint on alienation absent a showing of impaired security by
the lender. ",
The Washington court distinguished its holding on the basis that the
mortgage in Miller was construed only with respect to the provision allowing
the lender to increase the mortgage interest on the loan." Because the Bell-
ingham mortgage had no such provision, it was held to be an acceleration
clause and, as such, was subject to a requirement of necessity for enforce-
ment. 8
The Miller decision pointed out that the escalation provision may
impair a seller's ability to command his preferred asking price, but it in no
way restrains his ability to alienate the property. 9 The court concluded that
the mortgagee in Miller "merely pursued its rights under a provision that was
clearly stated in the agreement.""0
Continental Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not dealt specifically with the issue
of enforceability of due-on-sale clauses. It did, however, address the issue
indirectly in Continental Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter.41
In that case, the lender sued to foreclose a mortgage based on the
failure of the mortgagor and his vendee to pay a 1 percent transfer fee
requested by the lender.42 Continental Federal based its right to foreclose on
an acceleration clause in the mortgage. 43 The mortgagors, on the other hand,
claimed that the lender had insufficient grounds to accelerate the mortgage
because the reason given for acceleration (nonpayment of a transfer fee) was
not a part of either the note or the mortgage . 4
The Oklahoma Supreme Court refused to foreclose the mortgage in
Fetter. The basis on which the court made its decision is of great importance
in interpreting the future impact of the case.
:4 Id. at 404, 545 P.2d at 549.
87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d 1090 (1976).
36 Id. at 438, 553 P.2d at 1091.
Id. at 438-39, 553 P.2d at 1091-92.
I d.
3' Miller v. Pacific First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 403-404, 545 P.2d
546, 548-49 (1976).
11 Id. The court qualified its approval of escalation clauses by implying that inequitable
or unconscionable conduct by the mortgagee could result in nonenforcement.
" 564 P.2d 1013 (Okla. 1977).
41 Id. at 1015.





The court made it clear that the issue on appeal was not the validity of
the due-on-sale clause in the mortgage."' It accepted" the finding of the trial
court "[tihat the subject mortgage is a valid legal and enforceable instrument
under which the plaintiff had a right to either approve or deny the transfer of
its loan from the defendants Fetter to the defendants Liddell. . . -"' The
court also found acceleration clauses to be "bargained-for elements of mort-
gages and notes." 4
In the Fetter opinion, the court recited rationales for use of acceleration
clauses generally49 and due-on-sale clauses specifically. 0 It seems doubtful
that the court meant to distinguish between the two kinds of clauses," but
the rationales given for each leaves some room for interpretation.
The rationale given for use of an acceleration clause was "to insure that
a responsible party is in possession, to protect the mortgagee from unantici-
pated risks, and to afford the lender the right to be assured of the safety of
his security."" Although this quote does not mention specifically the protec-
tion against rising interest rates, a fair reading of it would probably include
such protection. An "unanticipated risk" may well include a fluctuation in
interest rates.5 3
Such a conclusion seems likely in light of case law cited by the Fetter
court in support of its determination that acceleration clauses are not void in
Oklahoma as being contrary to public policy. 4 In the footnote text support-
ing that determination, the court cited a California case to explain the ration-
ale of due-on-sale clauses.5 That case expressly recognized the validity of a
lender accelerating a mortgage to protect himself from "losing the benefit of
a later increase in rates. '" 6 The California court continued: "[A] due-on-sale
clause is employed . . . so that [the lender] may take advantage of rising in-
" Id. at 1017.
46 Id.
"1 Id. at 1016.
11 Id. at 1017.
9 Id.
1o Id. at 1018.
11 The case cited by the court in support of its rationale for an acceleration clause, First
Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 92 Nev. 363, 550 P.2d 1271 (1976), dealt specifically with a due-
on-sale clause. Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla. 1977).
11 Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla. 1977).
1 See, e.g., Cherry v. Home Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 577, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 138 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969): "When interest rates are high, a lender runs the risk
they will drop and that the borrower will refinance his debt elsewhere .... On the other hand,
when money is loaned at low interest, the lender risks losing the benefit of a later increase in
rates."
" Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Okla. 1977),
citing Ray v. Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co., 170 Okla. 414, 40 P.2d 663 (1935).
" Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 n.8 (Okla. 1977),
quoting Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n., 62 Cal. App. 3d 309, 133 Cal. Rptr. 63, 71
(Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
11 Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 3d 309, 133 Cal. Rptr. 63, 71
(Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
1981]
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terest rates in the event his borrower transfers the security."" Based on the
Oklahoma court's latter explanation of the rationale for use of due-on-sale
clauses, it is likely that it does indeed recognize the validity of protecting
lenders against fluctuations in the interest rate market.
The Fetter court appears to require a mortgage acceleration and
foreclosure to meet a test of reasonableness to be upheld." Unclear,
however, is which party shoulders the burden of alleging and proving the
reasonableness or unreasonableness of the acceleration in issue. In First
Commercial Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 9 the case cited by the Oklahoma court to
describe the rationale for use of acceleration clauses,60 the Nevada Supreme
Court stated that due-on-sale clauses are entitled to automatic enforcement
where there is an outright sale by the trustor-vendor.1' Further, the court
placed upon the mortgagor the burden of showing unenforceability: "A
lender has the right to be assured in his own mind of the safety of his security
without the burden of showing at each transfer that his security is being
impaired.""2 The foregoing indicates that the Oklahoma court will require
the mortgagor to establish the unreasonableness of the acceleration of his
mortgage.
The Fetter opinion did not deal directly with the issue of enforceability
of due-on-sale clauses.63 Therefore, its impact on enforceability of due-on-
sale clauses is uncertain.
The court seemed to stress two factors in its decision not to allow the
foreclosure of the mortgage in Fetter. First, the underlying basis for the
foreclosure (the assessment of a transfer fee) was not a provision of either the
note or the mortgage and could not, therefore, be a bargained-for element of
either. 64 Second, the basis for foreclosure was not reasonable under the cir-
cumstances.6"
If these two factors are deemed required elements of enforcement in
future suits, the issue becomes whether due-on-sale clauses meet those re-
quirements.
1. The "Bargained-For" Requirement
As to the first requirement, the supreme court stated that acceleration
clauses are bargained-for elements of notes and mortgages designed to pro-
57 Id.
5" Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Okla. 1977).
1 550 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1976).
60 Continental Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Okla. 1977).
"1 First Comm'l Title, Inc. v. Holmes, 550 P.2d 1271, 1272 (Nev. 1976).
62 Id.
63 Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Okla. 1977).
64 Id. at 1016, 1019.
65 Id. at 1018-19. The court cited the case of Murphy v. Fox, 278 P.2d 820 (Okla. 1955)
as being an example of an acceleration and foreclosure that would be unreasonable or uncons-
cionable. The basis for that acceleration and foreclosure was nonpayment of taxes and mortgage
installments as called for under the terms of the mortgage. The defaulting mortgagor tendered
all sums due, and the court refused to enforce the acceleration clause based on a "technical




tect the mortgagee." The court did not disturb the trial court's finding that
the mortgage was a valid and enforceable instrument. 67 Indeed, the findings
of the trial court indicated a willingness on its part to enforce the due-on-sale
clause before it.'8 The trial court found "[t]hat the subject mortgage is a
valid legal and enforceable instrument under which the plaintiff had a right
to either approve or deny the transfer of its loan. .... 69
No reason appears to exist that would make escalation language any
less bargained-for than a due-on-sale clause it follows. Rather, an escalation
clause would put the mortgagor on even greater notice of the result of an
unauthorized transfer of the secured property. Such notice would bolster
even further the bargained-for nature of due-on-sale and escalation clauses. 70
2. The "Reasonableness" Requirement
It is not as clear from the Fetter opinion, however, as to what cir-
cumstances will meet the court's requirement of reasonableness. The court
cited Ray v. Oklahoma Furniture Manufacturing Co. 7I as authority for the
reasonableness requirement. 72 The court quoted from Ray, stating the test
for reasonableness to be:
whether the restriction imposed on one party is greater than is necessary
for the protection of the other ... whether the restraint is such only as
to afford a fair protection to the interest of the party in favor of whom




Such a "test" gives little help, as subjective factors must still be weighed in
determining what is "necessary" or "fair." Left unanswered is the question
of whether the exercise of a due-on-sale clause, in order to achieve a higher
loan portfolio yield, would be reasonable in Oklahoma. However, adequate
authority exists within the Fetter decision to support an affirmative answer.
For example, as noted earlier, the court cited Medovoi v. American
Savings & Loan Ass'n74 to explain the rationale for due-on-sale clauses. 75 The
quotation from Medovoi came directly from Cherry v. Home Savings &
66 Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1016-17 (Okla. 1977).
67 I/d.
"1 Id. at 1016.
69 Id.
70 A lender could perhaps insure the bargained for status of due-on-sale and escalation
clauses by making the language of the clauses as conspicuous as possible through the use of
bold-face capital letters. Further, acceptance of such clauses could be signified by way of the
mortgagor's signature on a line separate from the main body of the mortgage.
71 170 Okla. 414, 40 P.2d 663 (1935).
712 Continental Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Okla. 1977).
1 170 Okla. 414, 40 P.2d 663, 665 (1935).
7 62 Cal. App. 3d 309, 133 Cal. Rptr. 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
71 Continental Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Okla. 1977).
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Loan Ass'n,7' one of the earliest and most influential cases dealing with en-
forcement of a due-on-sale ciause.
The Cherry decision held, inter alia, that a due-on-sale clause does not
constitute an invalid restraint on alienation. 77 Further, the court held the use
of a due-on-sale clause to take advantage of rising interest rates to be a
perfectly valid action: "This is merely one example of ways taken to
minimize risks by sensible lenders."
'"7
The Cherry court considered prevailing economic realities in rendering
its decision. 79 Other courts, using the philosophy of Cherry as precedent,
have done the same.8 0 As the Cherry case pointed out, "a substantial loan
ordinarily is not obtained for the asking.""' Generally, the original
buyer/mortgagor is able to purchase realty only with the financial aid of an
institutional lender. As was said in Crockett v. First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n,82 it is the lender who provides the opportunity for the initial purchaser
to buy the realty. 83
Most first real estate mortgages are given to secure loans so that real
property may be purchased. It seems doubtful that the primary goal of a
mortgagor in negotiating a mortgage would be to acquire a loan to be used as
a bargaining tool in a subsequent sale. As Crockett points out:
A prime purpose of the loan [is] to enable the buyer to purchase the
realty. If the buyer sells before he obtains full equity, this purpose
ceases. Under our free enterprise system the lender may lend his money
under such terms as maximize his profits within the limits set by law.'
The reasons given by the above authorities indicate the inherent
reasonableness of exercising a due-on-sale clause to protect against a rising
interest rate market. The fact that the Oklahoma court cites to such cases to
explain the rationale for the clauses"5 might indicate that it, too, finds such
action to be reasonable.
The exercise of an escalation clause seems even more reasonable
76 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
Id., 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
', Id., 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138. See also Malouff v. Midland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 181
Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224
S.E.2d 580 (IS76); Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
" Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
"0 See, e.g., Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240
(1973); Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976);
Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
1 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). See also
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 189 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976); Gunther v.
White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973).
32 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580 (1976).
Id., 224 S.E.2d at 585.
$" Id.




because, as pointed out in Miller v. Pacific First Federal Savings & Loan
Ass'n," the seller's ability to alienate his property is in no way restrained
(only his ability to command his preferred asking price is hindered).87 It
should again be noted that the Washington court has distinguished between
enforcement of escalation clauses and due-on-sale clauses.8 8 The latter was
said to be unenforceable without a showing of impaired security, 9 while the
former was an enforceable contract right "clearly stated in the [mortgage]
agreement." 8
The Cherry and Crockett cases provide further evidence of the
reasonableness of escalation clauses and their exercise. Both cases dealt with
the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses accompanied by escalation language.
As the court stated in Crockett, the lender provided the opportunity for the
initial purchase, and, therefore, "[iut seems fair for the lender to be able to
contract to receive an increased interest rate, on the very loan that is
facilitating transfer of the property, in the event the original purchaser
decides he is not going to continue ownership or pay off the loan. ... "I"
The Cherry court noted that a due-on-sale provision could not prevent
a mortgagor from selling to a third party.92 The mortgagee could, however,
as a matter of contract right, refuse to accept the new purchaser as assignee
of the mortgage unless the mortgagee received a satisfactory interest rate on
the balance of the secured debt. 93
The Cherry decision went so far as to say that there was no requirement
that the lender act "reasonably" in deciding to enforce an escalation clause*:
"[The mortgagee] had the power of free decision regarding use of its money
by others, the right to determine in its own discretion whether it would exer-
cise its option [to accelerate the debt], and it had no obligation to act only in
a manner which others might term 'reasonable.' "9'
The Effect of Wellenkamp v. Bank of America
As stated earlier, the California Supreme Court, in Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America,96 overturned the Cherry decision and those California
36 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546 (1976).
1, Id., 545 P.2d at 548-49. Accord, Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App.
2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138-39 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
11 Bellingham First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Garrison, 87 Wash. 2d 437, 553 P.2d
1090, 1092 (1976).
,9 Id. at 1091.
90 Miller v. First Pacific Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 86 Wash. 2d 401, 545 P.2d 546, 548-49
(1976).
" Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585 (1976).
92 Cherry v. Home Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, 138 (2d
Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
" Id., 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138-39.
, The court hypothetically equated an escalation clause with a due date, stating that the
mortgagee need not act "reasonably" in refusing to waive either term. Id., 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
9, Id., 81 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
96 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). It should be noted that after
the Wellenkamp decision was announced, the California Supreme Court sent back for rehearing
1981]
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cases which followed Cherry. Given the fact that Fetter relied on the
philosophy of Cherry, what effect should Wellenkamp have on future
Oklahoma decisions concerning due-on-sale and escalation clauses? The
answer is probably none, because the underlying rationale of Cherry is still
valid today. As noted earlier, long-term amortized loans expose lenders to
various risks." Lenders, therefore, should be allowed to remain as secure as
possible in the creation and administration of such loans.
The statement in Wellenkamp that lenders should and do take possible
market fluctuations into consideration when setting interest rates9" does not
take into account the economic realities of today. Given the volatile nature of
the money market, coupled with the current political and economic climates,
both nationally and internationally, it would require uncanny insight to pro-
ject accurately the possible market fluctuations over the course of a three-
decade loan.
A 1970 study indicated that the average life of real estate mortgage
loans is approximately eight to ten years. 9 As of year-end 1978, all operating
savings and loan associations held 82.7 percent of their total assets in mort-
gage loans." ' If a mortgage securing a loan with a lower-than-market in-
terest rate were allowed to be passed from one party to another and not be
subject to acceleration by the lender, it would be the unusual loan that did
not go the full term before completely paid. If mortgages were allowed to
continue in that manner, the bulk of the lender's assets (mortgage loans)
would bear an unprofitable return for many years past their anticipated pro-
fitable life (if demand obligations earned higher rates than rates received on
such mortgage loans).
Medevoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, originally decided at 62 Cal. App. 3d 309, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 67 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (cited by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Continental Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. Fetter, 564 P.2d 1013, 1018 (Okla. 1977)).
On rehearing, at 89 Cal. App. 3d 244 (Dist. Ct. App. 1979), the court of appeals inter-
preted Wellenkamp to apply only to those property transfers in which an owner of a single
family residence engages in a transfer of his interest in the secured property. Id. at 257.
Wellenkamp was held inapplicable to involuntary transfers or to transfers of commercial prop-
erty. Id. However, the California Supreme Court ordered the latter Medevoi decision decertified,
.,a process by which the California Supreme Court deletes opinions certified for publication by
the Appellate Division." Nussbaum & Stein, Due-on-Sale Clauses Split the Courts, NATL L.J.,
Oct. 20, 1980 at 17, col. 1, cont'd at 18, col. 3.
At least one other court has reached the same conclusion as the latter Medovoi decision.
In Holiday Acres No. 3 v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, C-50637 (Minn., endorsed Apr. 3,
1981), it was held that where a mortgage contract is negotiated by experienced business people,
and there is no allegation of improper conduct, fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching, a due-
on-sale clause does not constitute an unlawful restraint upon the alienation of investment prop-
erty. Id., slip op. at 28.
" See text accompanying notes 5 and 78, supra.
98 Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 952, 582 P.2d 970, 976, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 385 (1978).
'9 UNITED STATES LEAGUE OF SAVINGS & LOAN Assoc., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COM-
MITTEE ON SAVINGS ASSOCIATION NEEDS (1970).




Effect of Nonenforcement of Due-On-Sale and Escalation Clauses
Nonenforcement of due-on-sale and escalation clauses could result in
far-reaching unfavorable consequences. Quite possibly, long-term loans
would become unavailable from some lenders who would feel forced to pro-
tect against long-term interest rate increases. Such lenders would be forced to
offer shorter term loans that would, of course, increase monthly installments
on the debt.'
More likely, however, is the possibility that only state chartered institu-
tions would be affected in such a manner. The regulations of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, which affect all federally chartered savings and
loan associations, expressly allow the use of due-on-sale and escalation
clauses in the loan instruments of such associations. 0 2 Although these
lenders are somewhat limited as to the exercise of due-on-sale clauses, 0 3 such
exercise is generally "exclusively governed by the terms of the loan
contract."
0 4
Assuming these federal regulations are applicable to federally chartered
savings and loan associations, notwithstanding state law decisions to the con-
trary, 05 state chartered associations could be put to great disadvantage if the
exercise of due-on-sale clauses were not an option readily available to them.
While state chartered lenders may be forced to protect against vagaries of the
1°1 See generally Ashley, Use of "'Due-On" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A
Common-Sense Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 592 (1975).
102 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(0 (1980). "(f) Due-on-sale clauses. An association continues to
have the power to include, as a matter of contract between it and the borrower, a provision in
its loan instrument whereby the association may, at its option, declare immediately due and
payable sums secured by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the real prop-
erty securing the loan is sold or transferred by the borrowers without the association's prior writ-
ten consent.... [A] Federal association... waives its option to exercise a due-on-sale clause as
to a specific transfer if, before the transfer, the association and the person to whom the property
is to be sold or transferred ... agree in writing that the person's credit is satisfactory to the
association and that interest on sums secured by the association's security interest will be payable
at a rate the association shall request."
103 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3 (g)(1), (2) (1980). "a Federal association: (1) Shall not exercise a
due-on-sale clause because of (i) creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the
association's security instrument, (ii) creation of a purchase money security interest for
household appliances; (iii) transfer by devise, descent, or operation of law on the death of a joint
tenant; or (iv) granting of a leasehold interest of three years or less not containing an option to
purchase; (2) shall not impose a prepayment charge or equivalent fee for acceleration of the loan
by exercise of a due-on-sale clause; . .
10, Id. and § 545.8-3(0 (1980).
10, This note does not address the validity of such an assumption. For discussions of this
issue, see Comment, Due-on-Sale Clauses and Restraints on Alienation: Does Wellenkamp
Apply to Federal Institutions?, 11 PAC. L.J. 1085 (1980); Comment, A Case for Preemption;
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America is Inapplicable to Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 219 (1980). Compare Glendale Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Fox, 459 F.
Supp. 903 (C.D. Cal. 1978) and Conference of Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 495 F. Supp.
12 (E.D. Cal. 1979) with First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156 (Dist. Ct.
App. Fla. 1980).
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market by offering only short-term loans with high monthly payments,",'
federally chartered lenders would be free to offer the traditional, long-term
amortized loan with lower monthly payments. Naturally, prospective buyers
would seek the latter to finance their purchase, thereby adversely affecting
state chartered institutions.
Based on the foregoing, it seems that the ability to exercise a due-on-
sale clause upon transfer of property could actually promote availability of
mortgage money. One commentator noted that the availability of due-on-sale
clauses has actually helped hold down overall mortgage interest rates. 10 Such
positive results realized by enforcement of due-on-sale clauses should be kept
in mind by courts when deciding the necessary requirements for enforcement
of such clauses. Faced with the possibility that sources of mortgage money
may dry up if due-on-sale clauses are not readily enforceable, it seems ob-
vious that the benefits of the clauses far outweigh the burdens. As long as
lenders are required to meet a good faith standard of conduct and act in a
manner not unconscionable toward mortgagors, the interests of the public
are adequately protected.
Conclusion
This note has demonstrated the inherent validity of due-on-sale clauses
and the potential harms that could result from an inability to enforce them.
Although arguments exist for severely restricting enforcement, they must give
way to the economic necessities of our day. At a time when mortgage money
is increasingly scarce and costly, courts should adopt positions that help keep
a free flow of mortgage money available at rates affordable by persons other
than just the wealthy.
This note also has explored the possible effects of Continental Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Fetter0 8 on the enforceability of due-on-sale clauses
in future Oklahoma cases. Based on authority cited by the court in Fetter,
the following conclusions may be fairly drawn:
(1) Due-on-sale clauses are not invalid restraints upon alienation.
(2) The exercise of due-on-sale clauses to obtain a higher interest rate
on the balance of a loan is a valid, acceptable, and reasonable action.
(3) No showing of waste or risk to security is necessary to enforce a
due-on-sale clause.
(4) Due-on-sale clauses are entitled to automatic enforcement absent a
06 In Malouff v. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294, 509 P.2d 1240 (1973),
the Colorado Supreme Court noted that: "If lenders were unable to make some form of interest
rate adjustment on long term loans, they would have to make only short term loans amortized
over periods of less than ten years. Original borrowers then would not be able to pay off their
home purchases without having to refinance their indebtedness one or more times in the process.
Short term loans would also increase monthly payments and make the obtaining of such loans
prohibitive to many people."
,07 Ashley, Use of "Due-On" Clauses to Gain Collateral Benefits: A Common-Sense
Defense, 10 TULSA L.J. 590, 593 (1975).
--- 564 P.2d 1013, 1018, 1019 (Okla. 1977).
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